The Need for a Unified Process Safety Map

Knowing Where You're Going -- The Need for a Unified Process Safety Map

  Mr. Teddy Bucher Mr. John T. Perez, P.E. Cognascents Consulting Group, Inc. 11777-A Katy Fwy Ste 438 Houston, TX 77079

teddy.bucher@cognascents.com

 

Keywords: Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), Process Safety Management (PSM), Process Safety Information (PSI), effective communication, Independent Protection Layers (IPL), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), hazard identification, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), risk assessment, risk management.

Abstract  

Since the passage of the OSHA Process Safety Mandate, the various methods of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) have become commonplace. Process Safety Management (PSM) systems and the corresponding Process Safety Information (PSI) that feed into them have proliferated and permeated numerous aspects of production companies. As this has occurred, constituent groups within those companies have further developed the specific subsets of PSI relevant to them, yielding data sets that are increasingly useful and that allow them to operate more efficiently.

Yet with every PHA revalidation cycle, approaches in both preparation and execution frequently tend to concern themselves with the immediate - the presence of the direct inputs needed for the hazard analysis and the production of the direct outputs of the analysis. Viewing these separate components of PSM as distinct elements has a tendency to result in little consideration being given to the overall quality of the inputs, with the assumption that issues with the design of the input will be captured on the next revalidation cycle for that input. This approach of separate revalidation cycles for each element can be effective for the capture of design changes arising from major modifications to the process itself. However, it can also introduce the possibility for multiple changes to be made to a system in parallel, potentially rendering the input inadequate. It also overlooks the possibility that changes to one element of a PSM program could introduce new demands on another element previously thought to be adequate.

The authors posit that implementation of a unified process safety map that reflects the true interconnected nature of the various elements of a PSM program would minimize this potential for systemic error and allow for a more efficient PSM system. In this paper, the authors discuss the structure of an effective PSM program which utilizes a process safety map. This map would highlight how common PSM elements serve as both inputs to and outputs from the same processes through comprehensive communication of changes throughout the whole PSM program. In addition, the authors also provide examples of breakdowns in communication of PSI to illustrate the importance of a PSM program which continually improves as a whole, as a result of modifications to only one part of the program.

The target audience for this paper includes project managers, project engineers, EH&S managers, PSM coordinators, and operators; however, anyone involved with small or large capital projects may also benefit from this paper's content.